Each of n people, where n is greater than two, has an integer. They want to work out the sum modulo N , while revealing no additional information to each other or to anyone else. We describe a relatively efficient and natural way to carry out the addition securely using quantum information.
Introduction
A general multi-party computation involves n participants, who supply private data x i and obtain output functions f i (x 1 , . . . , x n ). The computation is said to be unconditionally secure if each participant can verify, with probability arbitrarily close to one, that every other participant obtains arbitrarily little information beyond their agreed output f i .
It can be shown that any multi-party computation can, in principle, be implemented in a way which is unconditionally secure if it is carried out on a quantum computer. [1] However, it seems unlikely that any general secure computation protocol will be efficient, or even necessarily practical, for any specific calculation. This raises the problem of finding algorithms efficiently adapted for carrying out given types of computation. More generally, a complexity theory for secure quantum computations seems to be needed to characterize how the resources used depend on the security parameters and the size of the numbers involved.
We take a small first step towards addressing these questions here by considering the problem of multi-party modular addition, in which all the f i are equal to the sum (x 1 +x 2 + . . . + x n ) modulo some given base N . We describe a natural algorithm for implementing multi-party additions via quantum states which illustrates the value of designing taskspecific quantum information algorithms. It may perhaps even generally be near-optimal, assuming that bit commitments can be carried out efficiently.
Multi-party addition
The algorithm works as follows. The parties agree numbers
for example by choosing the largest value for M ′ that any of them stipulates and then, once M ′ is agreed, choosing the largest value for p < 1 that any of them stipulates. For reasonable security, p will be close to 1, so that M will be large. The protocol operates on a single qubit, for which the parties have agreed a reference basis |0 , |1 and the rotation operator
.
(
The first participant P 1 initializes the qubit in the state |0 . She then chooses a random number r 1 from the set {0, . . . , N − 1}. She bit commits the values of r 1 and r 1 + x 1 -here, and below, additions are to be understood modulo N -separately to each of the other parties, using a secure quantum bit commitment protocol. [2] Finally, she applies the operator U r 1 +x 1 to the qubit, and passes it to P 2 . She similarly chooses a random number r 2 , bit commits r 2 and r 2 + x 2 , applies U r 2 +x 2 to the qubit, passes it on to P 3 , and so on, so that, if everyone follows the protocol, the qubit ends up in state U i (r i +x i ) |0 after P n has acted on it. After acting on it, P n carries out a measurement on the qubit in the |0 , |1 basis, and announces the result -a |0 or a |1 -to everyone else.
This process is repeated M times on M qubits, with independent random choices of the r i being made each time. (Of course, the same particle can be reused each time if the participants wish.) Everyone now has a large collection of measurement data, but no information about the x i can be extracted from those data alone.
Next the participants take it in turns to nominate a proportion p of the calculations to test that the protocol is being carried out honestly. That is, P 1 first nominates any pM of the calculations, then P 2 nominates p(1 − p)M of the remaining (1 − p)M , and so on. For each of the nominated calculations, everyone unveils their bit commitments of the numbers r i + x i to everyone else. This allows everyone to check that the measurement statistics announced by P n are indeed statistically consistent with the protocol, including P n 's final measurements, having been followed faithfully, and in particular that no unauthorised measurements have been carried out. Each participant has ensured that p is sufficiently large that, if the protocol passes this check, they will be confident enough of everyone's honesty to proceed to the M ′ revelations required in the next stage. Any participant may stop the protocol at this stage if it fails the statistical checks: if it is stopped, no one has given away any information about their data.
If the protocol passes these tests, the participants then proceed to unveil their bit commitments of the r i for the remaining large, any given degree of confidence can be attained.
Comments
The algorithm is adapted from a classical cryptographic algorithm for multi-party addition.[3,p.134] The quantum version has the significant advantage that it, unlike the classical algorithm, allows all the parties to be confident of the final calculation: P n cannot misrepresent the measurement results without her cheating (very probably) being detected.
The algorithm seems practical even for moderately large integers, assuming that the bit commitments required can be carried out reasonably efficiently. It is perhaps worth noting that if the participants want to carry out ordinary addition rather than modular addition, they can of course do so, as long as they have bounds on the x i , by taking N sufficiently large or by running the algorithm several times for a suitable variety of different N .
